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Abstract
In this study, we analyze a dynamic duopoly game in which firms can use advertis-
ing and price as competitive tools. The market is assumed to be completely covered in
the sense that all consumers purchase a product from one of the two firms. We assume
that advertising creates a positive externality. Thus, each firm voluntarily advertises to
persuade consumers to buy its products over those of the other firm, even though the
firms compete with one another in price. Two cases are considered: an interior case and
a corner case. In this situation, we investigate how changes in consumer preference and
firm technology level affect advertising, profits, and economic welfare and highlight the
differences between the two cases.
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1 Introduction
Advertising is an important behavior of firms. Firms that produce nearly physically identi-
cal goods are thought to advertise to increase their market share. A considerable amount of
literature has analyzed this type of advertising (Jørgensen (1982), Feichtinger et. al. (1994),
Dockner et. al. (2000), and Huang, Leng, and Liang (2012)). However, advertising can
be also interpreted as a public good; within an industry where firms compete with one
another, each firm voluntarily advertises to persuade customers to buy its products over
those of other firms (Friedman (1983), Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Martin (1993), and
Piga (1998)). This situation occurs because voluntary advertising is known to create a pos-
itive externality. Thus, advertising by one firm benefits all other firms within an indus-
try that produce the same industrial products. As the number of customers increases, all
firms within the industry increase their profits. Voluntary advertising is frequently used by
emerging industries, in which format competitions such as that which occurred between
Blu-ray and HD DVD manufacturers, are common. Firms that produce products with a
unique proprietary format use advertising to increase their market size.
Piga (1998) and Tenryu and Kamei (2013, 2014) investigated the relationship between
advertising and production quality using the product differentiation model. Piga (1998)
used the Hotelling (1929) location model and obtained results showing that market and
advertising shares are positively correlated. Furthermore, he showed that industry size
increases with the difference in firm production efficiency1: when the efficiency difference
increases, the larger-share firm increases its advertising as the lower-share firm decreases
it. Tenryu and Kamei (2013, 2014) adopted a vertical product differentiation model in their
work. These authors first considered (2013) a covered market in which all consumers buy a
product. In this scenario, the firm with the largest market share has the largest advertising
share, and a positive relationship exists between the difference in product quality and the
number of customers in the industry. An increase in quality difference also leads to an
expansion of advertising by both types of firm. In subsequent work, Tenryu and Kamei
(2014) considered a situation in which the market was not covered by consumers. In this
case, a technological improvement by a low-quality firm led to an increase in the advertising
and profit of the firm if technological gap between firms is relatively large.
In this study, we focus on a covered market and extend the previous advertising model
of Tenryu and Kamei (2013) in two directions. First, following the work of Wauthy (1996),
we consider two cases of a covered market: an interior case and a corner case. Tenryu and
Kamei (2013) previously focused on an interior case alone. Second, we analyze consumer
behavior using the utility-based approach. Consumer behavior has received little investi-
gation in the existing literature, including the work of Piga (1998) and Tenryu and Kamei
(2013). Several previous studies (Colombo and Lambertini (2003); Lambertini (2005); Lam-
bertini and Palestini (2009); Bertuzzi and Lambertini (2010)) have used the utility-based
approach to investigate the role of advertising investment. However, these works used the
Hotelling (1929) location model and did not analyze voluntary advertising. Under these
extensions, we investigate how changes in consumer preference and firm technology level
1In the work of Piga (1998), the production efficiency depends on the marginal costs.
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affect advertising, profit, and economic welfare and highlight the differences between the
two cases.
The main results of the paper may be summarized as follows. First, a high-quality firm
possesses the largest market share, advertising share, and profit in both the interior and
corner cases. Second, an increase in the minimum willingness to pay has different effects
on the profits of the firms and economic welfare in both cases. Third, assuming a relatively
small preference dispersion and relatively large technological gap, a rise in the technology
level of a low-quality firm increases the advertising and profit of the firm in both cases.
Finally, changes in preference dispersion and the technological gap differently affect indi-
vidual utility and consumer surplus.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the basic setup
of the model. Section 3 derives the steady states and characterizes the domains of the inte-
rior and corner cases. Section 4 analyzes producer surplus. We investigate how the main
parameters of the model affect the total advertising volume, total number of customers in
the market, and firm profits. In Section 5, we also investigate the effects of the parameters
on individual consumers and consumer surplus. Section 6 concludes the work.
2 The Model
The basic structure of the firms and consumers in the present study is the same as that
presented in Tenryu and Kamei (2013, 2014). In this economy, there exists a high-quality
firm, H, and a low-quality firm, L. The high-quality firm produces high-quality goods,
and the low-quality firm produces low-quality ones. The technology level of each firm is
exogenously given by si for i 2 fL,Hg and is assumed to satisfy the relation, sH > sL.
The consumers are uniformly distributed along a line with density N and have several
preferences for goods, as defined by q 2 [q, q¯]. This parameter represents each consumer’s
marginal willingness to pay, and q¯ (q) exogenously indicates the maximum (and minimum)
value.2 Given these preferences and the covered market, each consumer is assumed to
buy a good from either the high-quality or low-quality firm. The indirect utility function
at time t is ui(q, t) = qsi   pi(t), i 2 fL,Hg, where ui(q, t) represents the instantaneous
utility generated from consumption of a good i at time t and pi(t) is good i’s price at time t.
Utility is assumed to be nonnegative. The lifetime discounted present value of utility for a
consumer with q is defined as follows:
u¯i(q) =
Z ¥
0
(qsi   pi(t))e rtdt, i 2 fL,Hg,
where r is the discount rate.
Because all consumers in the market purchase one good unit from either firm H or L, a
threshold divides the market. This threshold characterizes a consumer who has no prefer-
2Because Tenryu and Kamei (2013) concentrated on firm analysis, they assumed q = 0. In this situation,
however, negative consumer utility is possible. To avoid this scenario, we assume q > 1, as shown in As-
sumption 1 below.
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ence for buying the high-quality or the low-quality good, and may be defined as follows:
q˜(t) =
pH(t)  pL(t)
sH   sL . (1)
Therefore, at any given time, consumers with the preference, q 2 [q, q˜] buy the low-quality
good and consumers with the preference, q 2 [q˜, q¯] buy the high-quality good. Accordingly,
N(t)(q¯   q) represents the number of consumers in the industry at time t.
In addition, following the work of Wauthy (1996) we distinguish between an interior
case and a corner case. We consider both cases because the utility of a consumer with the
minimum willingness to pay, q, may be either positive or negative. These situations are
illustrated in Figure 1.
WL
θ
θ˜θ
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θ¯
ui(θ, t)
(a) Interior case
WL
θ
θ˜θ
WH
θ¯
ui(θ, t)
(b) Corner case
Figure 1: Utility function
We designate the case in which utility is positive at q as the interior case and the case
in which utility is zero as the corner case. In the interior case, no consumer is assumed to
have a preference q under q.3 Conversely, in the corner case, a consumer with preference
q has no preference between buying product L and refraining from buying the product.
Such a customer is defined as the solution to qsL   pL(t) = 0, which is represented as pCL .
Variables with the superscript C indicate equilibrium values in the corner case. Because sL
and q are given, firm L commits its price to pCL over time. Given the price and the opponent’s
strategy, firm L chooses its advertising strategy and firm H chooses its price and advertising
strategies to maximise their lifetime profits.
We impose the following assumption on the maximum and minimum willingness to
pay:
Assumption 1. Assume q > 1 and q¯ > 4q   3.
This guarantees that both firms earn positive profits, utility is non-negative, and both
interior and corner cases exist.4 We can summarize the domain of the model in Figure 2.
3Tenryu and Kamei (2013) considered this case.
4The domains in which interior and corner cases exist are determined by the equilibrium prices, as is
discussed in Section 3.4 below.
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Figure 2: The restriction for q¯ and q
3 Characterization of the equilibrium path
3.1 Interior case
First, we consider the interior case in which both firms decide their strategies given q¯, q,
si, the initial state, and the opponent’s strategies. From the indirect utility functions, the
demand functions may be represented as follow:
N(t)yL(t) = N(t)(q˜(t)  q) = N(t)

pH(t)  pL(t)
sH   sL   q

, (2)
N(t)yH(t) = N(t)(q¯   q˜(t)) = N(t)

q¯   pH(t)  pL(t)
sH   sL

, (3)
where yL(t) and yH(t) are defined as the market shares of firm L and H, respectively, be-
cause both firms face a common density of consumers, as explained below.
The sum of the discounted present value of the profit for firm i, Vi, is represented by the
following equation:
Vi =
Z ¥
0
pi(t)e rtdt =
Z ¥
0
h
N(t)yi(t)(pi(t)  si)  mAi(t)2
i
e rtdt, (4)
where pi(t) is firm i’s profit at time t, Ai(t) is the investment in advertisement at time t,
mAi(t)2 is the investment cost at time t, and m is the exogenous positive parameter. Fol-
lowing the work of Tenryu and Kamei (2013, 2014), we assume that each firm’s unit cost is
a linear function of its technology level and that the firms’ discount rates are equal to the
consumer’s discount rate, r.
The state variable evolves according to the following state equation:
N˙(t) = a(AH(t) + AL(t))  lN(t), N(0)  0, (5)
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where a(> 0) is the advertising efficiency parameter, l(> 0) is the depreciation rate, and
N(0) is the initial stock. This law of motion implies that advertising is cooperative behavior,
in the sense that advertising by one firm benefits both firms. Therefore, the advertising may
be interpreted as a public good.5
To solve the duopolistic game defined above, we use the Hamiltonian function. The
Hamiltonian equation for firm i is represented as follows:
HIi = N(t)yi(t)(pi(t)  si)  mAi(t)2 + fi(t)[a(AH(t) + AL(t))  lN(t)] (6)
We may thereby obtain the following optimality conditions of both firms. Firm i’s optimal
conditions are represented as follow:
¶HIi
¶pi
= 0, (7)
¶HIi
¶Ai
= 0 () fi(t) = 2ma Ai(t), (8)
f˙i(t) =  
¶HIi
¶N
+ rfi(t) = (l+ r)fi(t)  yi(t)(pi(t)  si), (9)
0 = lim
t!¥ fi(t)N(t)e
 rt (10)
From (7), we obtain the following optimal prices:
pIH =
(2q¯   q)(sH   sL) + 2sH + sL
3
, and pIL =
(q¯   2q)(sH   sL) + sH + 2sL
3
(11)
Variables with the superscript I indicate equilibrium values in the interior case. These prices
are guaranteed to be positive under the assumption sH > sL and are constant over time.6
We can easily confirm that pIH is always higher than p
I
L.
These prices lead to an equilibrium threshold, calculated as q˜ I = q¯+q+13 . This threshold
represents an increasing function of q¯ and q but is independent of firm technology levels.
Each firm’s market share, therefore, may be calculated as follows:
yIH = q¯   q˜ I =
2q¯   q   1
3
, and yIL = q˜
I   q = q¯   2q + 1
3
.
Under Assumption 1, firm i’s unit profit (pIi   si) the threshold, and both firms’ market
shares are always positive. The threshold value is independent of both firms’ technology
levels. In the corner case below and the uncovered market case (Tenryu and Kamei (2014)),
this situation is not observed. In addition, we can confirm that the market share of firm H is
5In our model, the state equation and firms’ profit functions are linear with respect to the state variable.
This situation is called the linear state game: in this case the control variables are independent from the state
variable, and the open-loop equilibrium is Markov perfect. (See Dockner, et al. (2000), section 7.3.)
6For pIL to be positive,
sH
sL
must be larger than q¯ 2q 2
q¯ 2q+1 . This condition is always satisfied because
q¯ 2q 2
q¯ 2q+1 is
smaller than 1.
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always higher than that of firm L and that both shares are increasing (decreasing) functions
of q¯ (q) but independent of si.
Next, wemay use (9) and (11) to obtain steady state co-state variables and the following
equation:
fIi =
yIi (p
I
i   si)
l+ r
. (12)
This equation and (8) immediately lead to equilibrium advertising strategies:
AIH =
a(2q¯   q   1)2(sH   sL)
18m(l+ r)
, and AIL =
a(q¯   2q + 1)2(sH   sL)
18m(l+ r)
. (13)
From (5), N˙ = 0 leads to the following equation:
N I =
a
l
(AIH + A
I
L) =
a2(sH   sL)[4(q¯   q)2 + (q¯   1)2 + (q   1)2]
18lm(l+ r)
. (14)
This equation represents the steady state consumer density. Additionally, by solving (14),
we derive the trajectory of the consumer density as N I(t) = N I + [N(0)   N I ]e lt. This
result implies that, if the initial density is higher (lower) than the steady state value, the
function monotonically decreases (increases) and converges to the steady state.
3.2 Transversality conditions and stability
In this subsection, we confirm that the equilibrium path satisfies the transversality condi-
tions and that the dynamic system is stable. We use equations (2), (3), and (11) to solve the
differential equations for the costate variables, (9). The following equations are obtained:
fIH(t) =
(2q¯   q   1)2(sH   sL)
9(l+ r)
+

fIH(0) 
(2q¯   q   1)2(sH   sL)
9(l+ r)

e(l+r)t,
fIL(t) =
(q¯   2q + 1)2(sH   sL)
9(l+ r)
+

fIL(0) 
(q¯   2q + 1)2(sH   sL)
9(l+ r)

e(l+r)t.
By substituting these equations and the consumer density function, N(t), we may prove
that the transversality conditions are satisfied. The result is summarized in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. The transversality conditions of firm L and firm H are satisfied if and only if the initial
costate variables are as follow:
fIH(0) =
(2q¯   q   1)2(sH   sL)
9(l+ r)
and fIL(0) =
(q¯   2q + 1)2(sH   sL)
9(l+ r)
. (15)
Proof. The proof follows that presented in Appendix A of Tenryu and Kamei (2014).
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The condition (15) requires that both costate variables are constant at the steady state
value. This situation means that the advertising strategies and revenue per density for each
firm7 are also constant at the steady state value. From (8) and (12), we obtain the following
equation:
fIi =
2m
a
AIi =
yIi (p
I
i   si)
l+ r
. (16)
Therefore, all variables except N I(t) are constant, and the complete dynamical system of
the model may be represented with only the law of motion for consumer density (5). As
discussed above, the consumer density function converges to the steady state value, and
the dynamical system is thus globally stable.
3.3 Corner case
Let us consider the corner case. As discussed in section 2, the optimal price for firm L is
pCL = qsL. Because q and sL are exogenously given, the price p
C
L is constant for any time t.
As for the interior case, we may derive the following demand functions:
N(t)yL(t) = N(t)(q˜(t)  q) = N(t)
 
pH(t)  pCL
sH   sL  
pCL
sL
!
, (17)
N(t)yH(t) = N(t)(q¯   q˜(t)) = N(t)
 
q¯   pH(t)  p
C
L
sH   sL
!
. (18)
The sum of the discounted present value of the profit for firm i and the state equation are
the same as (4) and (5), respectively. Unless the minimum willingness to pay is greater
than 1, firm L’s profit cannot be positive.8 Firm L’s Hamiltonian equation, therefore, is as
follows:
HCL = N(t)yL(t)(pCL   sL)  mAL(t)2 + fL(t)[a(AH(t) + AL(t))  lN(t)].
Because firm L commits its price to pCL , the price is not a control variable; firm L chooses its
optimal advertising strategy as the only control variable. Therefore, first-order conditions
may be given as (8), (9), and (10). In contrast, firm H’s problem is the same as that in
the interior case, and first-order conditions are thus given as (7)  (10). Substituting firm
L’s price into the first-order condition with price H, we obtain firm H’s optimal price as
follows:
pCH =
q¯(sH   sL) + sH + qsL
2
. (19)
7Firm i’s revenue at time t is N I(t)yIi (p
I
i   si). When N(t) = 1, the firm’s revenue is represented as
yIi (p
I
i   si). We call this value firm i’s revenue per density.
8The instantaneous profit of firm L is pL(t) = N(t)yL(t)(q   1)sL   mAL(t)2, such that if q is smaller than
1, the firm’s profit cannot be positive. Therefore, the first condition in Assumption 1 is required.
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This price is also constant over time because it depends on only exogenous parameters, and
it is higher than pCL .
9 The threshold value of the corner case is, therefore, q˜C = q¯(sH sL)+sH qsL2(sH sL) .
In contrast to that of the interior case, this threshold depends on each firm’s technology and
is an increasing function of q¯ and sH but an decreasing function of q and sL. Therefore, each
firm’s market share may be obtained as follows:
yCH = q¯   q˜C =
(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sL
2(sH   sL) and y
C
L = q˜
C   q = (q¯   2q + 1)sH   (q¯   q)sL
2(sH   sL) .
Within the domain of the corner case, both shares are positive, and yCH is larger than y
C
L .
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These parameters differ from those of the interior case in that yCi is affected by si and that q
has an opposite effect on q˜C and yCH.
The equilibrium advertising strategies and steady state consumer density are repre-
sented as follow:
ACH =
a[(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sL]2
8m(l+ r)(sH   sL) and A
C
L =
a[(q¯   2q + 1)sH   (q¯   q)sL](q   1)sL
4m(l+ r)(sH   sL) ,
(20)
NC =
a2[(q¯   1)2s2H   2f(q¯   q)2 + (q   1)2gsHsL + (q¯   q)(q¯   3q + 2)s2L]
8lm(l+ r)(sH   sL)2 . (21)
As with (14), (21) is represented as the sum of both firms’ advertising investments, and
positive advertising investments therefore lead to positive consumer density.
Finally, in the same way as that presented in the previous section, we can confirm that
the transversality condition holds and that the dynamic system of the model is globally
stable.
Corollary 1. The transversality conditions of firm L and firm H are satisfied if and only if the initial
costate variables are as follow:
fCH(0) =
[(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sL]2
4(l+ r)(sH   sL) and f
C
L (0) =
[(q¯   2q + 1)sH   (q¯   q)sL](q   1)sL
2(l+ r)(sH   sL) .
3.4 Domain of the interior and corner cases.
In the previous subsection, we computed equilibrium candidates corresponding to the inte-
rior and corner cases. In this subsection, following the work of Wauthy (1996), we identify
the parameter constellations for which the candidates effectively yield the corresponding
market outcomes.
The corner case exits when there exists a range of parameter values where neither con-
dition pPL > qsL nor p
I
L < qsL. The price p
P
L represents firm L’s equilibrium price in an
9The condition required for pCH > p
C
L to be satisfied is
sH
sL
> q¯+q
q¯+1 . As discussed below, this condition is
satisfied within the existing region of the corner case, sHsL 2

q¯+q 2
q¯ q+1 ,
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3

.
10The domain is derived in the next subsection.
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uncovered market, which is obtained as pPL =
sL q¯(sH sL)+3sHsL
4sH sL .
11 The former condition im-
plies that, in this situation, an uncovered market exists. Under the latter condition, the
price in the interior case is lower than that in the corner case, and consumers thus pur-
chase good L at the price pIL. Therefore, the market is not covered at equilibrium when
sH
sL
2
h
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 ,¥

, the market is covered by firm L quoting a price just sufficient to cover
the market when sHsL 2
h
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1 ,
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3

, and the market is covered in the usual sense when
sH
sL
2

1, q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1

.1213 In the following section, we analyze the interior and corner cases in
accordance with these domains.
4 Producer surplus
In this section, we investigate how the control variables, state variable, and firms’ lifetime
profits respond to changes in preference dispersion and technological gap. In the next sub-
section, we calculate the firms’ lifetime profits on the equilibrium path and investigate
which firm earns more profit. We then calculate comparative statics for prices, advertis-
ing, consumer density, and lifetime profits. For notational simplicity, we define a firm’s
instantaneous revenue per density, yki (p
k
i   si), as zki , k 2 fI,Cg.
4.1 Firms’ lifetime profits
Firm i’s lifetime profit is defined by (4). By substituting equilibrium values obtained above
into (4), we obtain the following equation:
Vki =
Z ¥
0
h
N(t)zki   m(Aki )2
i
e rtdt =
N(0)zki
l+ r
+
lNkzki   (l+ r)m(Aki )2
r(l+ r)
, k 2 fI,Cg. (22)
Furthermore, we may use (16) to rewrite this equation. The equation obtained below en-
ables us to understand how advertising investment affects profit:
Vki =
2m
r
"
rN(0)
a
Aki +
(Aki )
2
2
+ Aki A
k
j
#
, j 6= i, k 2 fI,Cg. (23)
We can confirm that a positive externality exists, as represented by the third term in the
square brackets. Each firm, therefore, benefits not only from its own advertising investment
but also from tits opponent’s advertising investment. Using this equation, we may obtain
the following proposition:
11See Tenryu and Kamei (2014) for the derivation of this equation.
12If the second condition of Assumption 1 is not satisfied, then the partial market cannot exit. Because
we follow the work of Wauthy (1996) and do not exclude the existence of an uncovered market, we assume
q¯ > 4q   3.
13Our model differs from that of Wauthy (1996) in terms of production cost. He assumes zero production
cost whereas we assume a linear production cost. In this case, pIL is always positive and thus there is no
market preempted by firm H.
10
Proposition 1. In a covered market, the investment and lifetime profit of firm H are always larger
than those of firm L.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.2 Comparative statics for prices, shares, and advertising
In this subsection, we investigate how each firm responds to changes in the maximum and
minimum willingness to pay and firm technology levels. Table 1 summarizes the effects
of changes in maximum preference, minimum preference, and firm technology levels on
prices, threshold, market shares, and advertising investment.
Table 1: Effects of increases in maximum and minimum willingness to pay and firm tech-
nology on price, threshold, market share, and advertising investment.
(a) Interior case
pIL p
I
H q˜
I yIL y
I
H A
I
L A
I
H
q¯ + + + + + + +
q     +        
sH + + 0 0 0 + +
sL    0 0 0    
(b) Corner case
pCL p
C
H q˜
C yCL y
C
H A
C
L A
C
H
q¯ 0 + + + + + +
q + +     +  +
sH 0 + + +   + +
sL +       +   
0 indicates no effect, and  indicates an ambiguous effect.
Table 1 states that the effect of q on the parameters varies between the two cases. In
the interior case, how pIL responds to an increase in sL is ambiguous.
14 In the corner case, it
should be noted that the effects of q or sL on firm L’s advertising ambiguous. We investigate
these situations in the following lemma15:
Lemma 2. If q¯ > 8q   7, ¶ACL¶q is always positive, and if 4q   3 < q¯  8q   7,
¶ACL
¶q
8>><>>:
< 0 if q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1  sHsL <
q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3
= 0 if sHsL =
q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3
> 0 if q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3 <
sH
sL
< q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 .
Furthermore, if q¯ > 10q   9, ¶ACL¶sL is negative; if 5q   4  q¯  10q   9,
¶ACL
¶sL
8>>>><>>>>:
< 0 if q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1  sHsL <
(q¯ q)+
p
(q¯ q)(q 1)
q¯ 2q+1
= 0 if sHsL =
(q¯ q)+
p
(q¯ q)(q 1)
q¯ 2q+1
> 0 if (q¯ q)+
p
(q¯ q)(q 1)
q¯ 2q+1 <
sH
sL
< q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 ;
14The derivative of pIL with respect to sL is
¶pIL
¶sL
=  q¯+2q+23 . Thus
¶pIL
¶sL
R 0 if and only if q¯ Q 2q + 2.
15The remaining results for advertising are given in Appendix B.
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and if 4q   3 < q¯  5q   4, ¶ACL¶sL is positive.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In contrast to the interior case, if the preference dispersion is relatively large in the corner
case, firm L increases (decreases) its advertising investment in response to an increase in q
(sL).
4.3 Comparative Statics for Consumer Density and Profits
Using the results obtained above, we can investigate how the parameters affect consumer
density. These effects are summarized as follow:
Proposition 2. The instantaneous consumer density, Nk(t), k 2 fI,Cg, and the steady state con-
sumer density, Nk, are increasing functions of the maximum willingness to pay and the technology
level of firm H and decreasing functions of the technology level of firm L. N I(t) and N I are de-
creasing functions, and NC(t) and NC are increasing functions, of the minimum willingness to pay,
q.
Proof. The consumer density at time t is represented as Nk(t) = Nk + [N(0)  Nk]e lt. We
may take its derivative with respect to y 2 fq¯, q, sH, sLg, yielding the following equation:
¶Nk(t)
¶y
=

1  1
elt

¶Nk
¶y
,
Because , lt is positive for any time t > 0, the value in parentheses is positive, whereas
thus the sign of ¶N
k(t)
¶y is determined by the change in the steady state value. Therefore, the
steady state value should be investigated.
The consumer density at the steady state is represented as Nk = ar (A
k
H + A
k
L). The signs
of the derivatives of Nk are determined by that of the sum of the derivatives of AkH and A
k
L.
For the interior case, the results are clear from Appendix B.
In the corner case, because advertising is an increasing function of q¯ and sH, consumer
density is also an increasing function of these parameters. Because the resulting situation is
not obtained immediately, we investigate the signs of the derivative of NC. Differentiating
(21) with respect to q yields the following equation:
¶NC
¶q
=
a2[2(q¯   2q + 1)sH   (2q¯   3q + 1)sL]
4lm(l+ r)(sH   sL) .
As shown in Appendix B, we may confirm that this equation is positive. Similarly, differ-
entiating (21) with respect to sL and rearranging, the result yields the following equation:
¶NC
¶sL
=  a
2[(q¯   q)(q¯   3q + 2)(sH   sL)2 + (q   1)2s2H]
8lm(l+ r)(sH   sL)2 .
Under Assumption 1, q¯  3q+ 2 is positive and thus the derivative of NC with respect to sL
is negative.
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This proposition implies that effect of the parameters on consumer density is analogous
to their effect on firm H’s advertising, even in a situation in which firm L’s advertising be-
havior differs from that of firm H. In other words, the advertising investment by firm H has
a dominant effect on the consumer density. The same result is obtained for an uncovered
market. (See Tenryu and Kamei (2014).)
In the corner case, the reason why firm L invests more in advertising even if consumer
density decreases is because the firm has an opportunity to increase its profits. In the in-
terior case, however, firm L does not have this opportunity. To analyze this result, we in-
vestigate how the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL affect the firms’ lifetime profits. For analytical
simplicity, we assume that the initial consumer density is zero. This model thus represents
an emerging industry.
Assumption 2. We assume that the initial consumer density is zero, N(0) = 0.
By differentiating (23) with respect to the parameters, we obtain the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3. The effects of the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL on firms’ lifetime profits are summa-
rized below:
Interior case
V IL V
I
H
q¯ + +
q    
sH + +
sL    
Corner case
VCL V
C
H
q¯ + +
q  +
sH + +
sL   
 indicates an ambiguous effect.
When q increases, there exists a q¯a 2 (5q   4, 6q   5) such that, if q¯ > q¯a, VCL increases, and if
4q   3 < q¯  q¯a,
¶VCL
¶q
8>><>>:
> 0 if sa < sHsL <
q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3 ,
= 0 if sHsL = sa,
< 0 if q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1  sHsL < sa,
where
sa =
sH
sL
=
(q¯   2q + 1)3 +pDa
(q¯   q)2(q   4q + 3) ,
Da = (q¯   2q + 1)6   (q¯   q)2(q¯   q)(q   4q + 3)[(q¯   q)(q¯   4q + 3)  2(q¯   2q + 1)(q   1)].
When sL increases, there exists an sb such that, if q¯ > 7.181q¯  6.181, VCL decreases, and if 4q  3 <
q¯  7.181q¯   6.181,
¶VCL
¶sL
8>><>>:
< 0 if sc  sHsL < sb
= 0 if sHsL = sb
> 0 if sb <
sH
sL
< q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 ,
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where
sc =
8<:
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1 if 4q   3 < q¯ < 5q   4
(q¯ q)+
p
(q¯ q)(q 1)
q¯ 2q+1 if 5q   4  q¯  7.181q¯   6.181.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Firm L cannot increase its profit in the interior case but can do so in the corner case.
This result is associated with the firm’s advertising behavior. Let us consider the interior
case. As q increases, the heterogeneity of preference becomes small; that is, q¯   q declines.
In this situation, firms should reduce their prices to remain their market shares (see Table
1). Even if the firms lower their prices, however, yIi declines so that profit per density, z
I
i ,
also declines. As shown by (16), the reduction of revenue per density causes a decrease in
advertising investment, which leads to a loss of consumer density. As a result, the profits of
both firms decrease. In the case of a rise in sL, the unit profits of both firms, pIi   si, decline
while their market shares remain unchanged. Thus, profits per density and advertising
investments of both firms also decrease. These changes reduce consumer density and the
firms’ lifetime profits.
Next, let us consider the corner case. As q increases, both firms should reduce their
prices. Firm L, however, commits its price to pCL = qsL so that an increase in q causes p
C
L
to increase. Because firm H knows this commitment, the firm has an incentive to increase
its price and is thus able to widen its share. This situation leads to rincreases in zH and
advertising. As a consequence, firm H enjoys an additional profit gain. In contrast, firm
L loses market share but can increase unit profit through its own price increase. If firm L
increases its revenue per density, its lifetime profit also increases. Even in the case where zCL
declines, an increase in advertising by firm H benefits firm L’s lifetime profit. This situation
occurs if the preference dispersion is large or if the dispersion is small but the technological
gap is relatively large.
When sL is improved, firm H extends its share by decreasing its price but cannot in-
crease revenue per density. This situation leads to reductions in advertising by firm H and
consumer density. Therefore, the lifetime profit of firm H decreases. In contrast, if the
technological gap is relatively large, the lifetime profit of firm L increases. This result oc-
curs because firm L can raise zCL by increasing its price at the expense of its market share
(see Lemma 2). In this situation, the firm can mitigate the loss of consumer density by an
advertising increase.
In an uncovered market, the effect of sL on the profit of firm L is similar to its effect in
the corner case.16 When the technology gap is relatively large, firm L enjoys an additional
profit because it can increase both its price and market share.
5 Welfare analysis
As in the previous section, we investigate how increases in the maximum willingness to
pay, minimum willingness to pay, firm H’s technology, and firm L’s technology affect the
16In a partially covered market, q has no direct effect on the parameters.
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economic welfare. In our model, consumers are heterogeneous with respect to product
preference, such that an increase in the parameters may have different effects on individual
consumer and consumer surplus (calculated as the sum of individual utility). Hence, in the
next subsectionwe first consider individual consumers and then analyze consumer surplus.
5.1 Individual utility
The instantaneous utility of the consumer of q is defined as ui(q, t) = qsi   pi(t). As dis-
cussed above, the prices are constant over time. This situation means that the instantaneous
utility of each consumer is constant and separated from the discount rate. Hence, we may
represent ui(q, t) as ui(q) and obtain the individual discounted sum of utility as follows:
u¯ki (q) =
Z ¥
0
(qsi   pki )e rtdt =
1
r
uki (q), i 2 fL,Hg, k 2 fI,Cg,
The function implies that effect of the parameters on lifetime utility is that of instantaneous
utility multiplied by the reciprocal of the discount rate. We may derive the lifetime utility
of the consumers who buy good i as follows:
u¯IH(q) =
1
r
uIH(q) =
(3q   2q¯ + q   2)sH + (2q¯   q   1)sL
3r
(24)
u¯IL(q) =
1
r
uIL(q) =
(3q + q¯   2q   2)sL   (q¯   2q + 1)sH
3r
. (25)
Because these equations are increasing functions of q, if the utility of consumers with pref-
erence q is positive, the utility of other consumers is also positive. Within the domain of the
interior case discussed in section 3.4, we can confirm that consumers of q obtain positive
utility. Using (24) and (25), we may obtain the following results:
Proposition 4. In the interior case, the effects of increases in the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL on
individual utility are summarized below.
u¯IL(q) u¯
I
H(q)
q¯    
q + +
sH   
sL + +
 indicates an ambiguous effect.
When firm H’s technology is improved, the change in the utility of consumers who purchase good
H may be represented as follows:
¶u¯IH(q)
¶sH
8><>:
> 0 if 2q¯ q+23 < q  q¯
= 0 if q = 2q¯ q+23
< 0 if q˜ I  q < 2q¯ q+23 .
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Proof. By differentiating (24) and (25) with respect to the different parameters, we obtain
the above results.
Similarly, we may derive the lifetime utility of consumers who purchase good i in the
corner case as follows:
u¯CH(q) =
1
r
uCH(q) =
(2q   q¯   1)sH + (q¯   q)sL
2r
(26)
u¯CL (q) =
1
r
uCL (q) =
(q   q)sL
r
. (27)
These equations are also increasing functions of q. In the corner case, consumers with q
obtain zero utility, but other consumers enjoy positive utility. From (26) and (27), we may
derive the following proposition:
Proposition 5. In the corner case, the effects of increases in the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL on
individual utility are summarized below:
u¯IL(q) u¯
I
H(q)
q¯ 0  
q    
sH   
sL  +
 indicates an ambiguous effect.
When firm H’s technology is improved, the change in utility of consumers who purchase good H
may be represented as follows:
¶u¯CH(q)
¶sH
8><>:
> 0 if q¯+12 < q  q¯
= 0 if q = q¯+12
< 0 if q˜C  q < q¯+12 .
When firm L’s technology is improved, the utility of consumers with q does not change, but the
utility of all other consumers with increases.
These propositions are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. The parameters have similar effects
on utility, except for q. When q¯ increases, firm H increases its price because new consumers
with stronger preferences buy good H (see Table 1). However, consumers with q 2 [q, q¯]
maintain their appreciation for goods; that is, the first term in the utility function does not
change. Therefore, these consumers are worse off. When sH increases, consumers who
buy good H appreciate the good to a greater degree; that is, the first term in the utility
function increases. At the same time, the price also increases. These effects on utility are
in opposition, leading to an ambiguous total effect. As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the
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utility of consumers with higher q 2 [qˆk, q¯] increases but that of consumers with lower
q 2 [q, qˆk) decreases. However, in the corner case, pCL is independent of q¯ and sH such that
utility of consumers who buy good L remains unchanged. When sL rises, the reduction
of pkH benefits consumers who purchase good H. Regarding the utility of consumers who
buy good L, the rise in their appreciation for the good dominates the price increase, even if
pkL increases. In the case of an increase in q, the heterogeneity of preference becomes small
and it is advantageous for firms to reduce their prices, which benefits all consumers (Figure
3(b)). In the corner case, however, firm L commits its price to pCL = qsL such that it cannot
reduce its price. Firm H knows this situation and can thus increase its price. Because the
appreciation of consumers buying good H is unchanged, their utility declines (Figure 4(b)).
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Figure 3: Comparative statics for individual utility (1): the interior case
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Figure 4: Comparative statics for individual utility (2): the corner case
5.2 Consumer surplus
In this subsection, we analyze economic welfare. To do so, we must consider the evolution
of consumer density, Nk(t). We define the lifetime consumer surplus as follows ;
W =
Z q˜k
q
Z ¥
0
N(t)(qsL   pkL)e rtdtdq +
Z q¯
q˜k
Z ¥
0
N(t)(qsH   pkH)e rtdtdq, k 2 fI,Cg.
For notational simplicity, we represent the sum of utility that consumers derive from pur-
chasing good i asWki :
WkL 
Z q˜k
q
(sLq   pkL)dq, and WkH 
Z q¯
q˜k
(sHq   pkH)dq. (28)
Because instantaneous utility is constant and the state variable is independent of consumer
preference, no interaction exists between q and t. Therefore, the lifetime surplus function
can be rearranged as follows:
Wk =
Z ¥
0
N(t)e rt(WkL +W
k
H)dt =
lNk(WkL +W
k
H)
r(l+ r)
, k 2 fI,Cg. (29)
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As discussed below, the effects of the parameters can be divided into advertising and
utility effects. The advertising effect is represented as the change in consumer density, and
the utility effect is represented by the change in the sum of utility, WkL +W
k
H. We first
investigate how the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL affect the sum of utility. The results are
summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. The effects of the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL on instantaneous consumer surplus are
summarized below.
W IL +W
I
H W
C
L +W
C
H
q¯ + +
q   
sH  +
sL + +
 indicates an ambiguous effect.
When q increases, the change in W IL +W
I
H may be represented as follows:
¶(W IL +W
I
L)
¶q
8>><>>:
> 0 if 7q¯ 2q 57q¯ 11q+4 <
sH
sL
< q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1
= 0 if sHsL =
7q¯ 2q 5
7q¯ 11q+4
< 0 if 1 < sHsL <
7q¯ 2q 5
7q¯ 11q+4 .
When sL increases, the change in W IL +W
I
H may be represented as follows:
¶(W IL +W
I
L)
¶sH
8><>:
> 0 if 4q   3 < q¯ < 6.098q   5.098
= 0 if q¯ = 6.098q   5.098
< 0 if 6.098q   5.098 < q¯.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The effects of q and sH in the interior case are ambiguous. An increase in q causes
both firms to reduce their prices, while consumers with lower q refrain from buying and
exit the market. For a relatively large (small) technological gap, the former (latter) trend
dominates, causing instantaneous consumer surplus to increase (decrease). Regarding sH
in the interior case, a rise in sH causes pIL to increase, which leads to the loss of consumer
surplus for relatively large preference dispersion.
Finally, we analyze lifetime consumer surplus using these results.
Proposition 6. The effects of the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL on lifetime consumer surplus are
summarized below:
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W I WC
q¯ + +
q   
sH + +
sL  
 indicates an ambiguous effect.
In the interior case, when q increases, there exists a q¯b 2 (4q   3, 5q   4) such that, for the
region where q¯ > q¯b, ¶W
I
¶sL
is negative. Otherwise,
¶W I
¶sL
8>><>>:
> 0 if Q < sHsL <
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1
= 0 if sHsL = Q
< 0 if 1 < sHsL < Q,
where
Q  4(2q¯   q   1)
2 + 6(q¯   1)(q¯   2q + 1)
(2q¯   q   1)(4q¯   5q + 1) + (q¯   2q + 1)(5q¯   4q   1) .
In the corner case, when q increases, there exist a q¯c 2 (4q   3, 5q   4) and an sb such that,
¶WC
¶q
8>><>>:
> 0 if q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1  sHsL < sb
= 0 if sHsL = sb
< 0 if sb <
sH
sL
< q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 .
For q¯ > q¯c, ¶W
C
¶q is positive. When sL increases, there exist a q¯ 2 (5q   4, 6q   5) and an sc such
that, for 4q   3 < q¯  q¯d,
¶WC
¶sL
8>><>>:
< 0 if q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1  sHsL < sc
= 0 if sHsL = sc
> 0 if sc < sHsL <
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 .
For q¯ > q¯d, ¶W
C
¶sL
is negative.
Proof. See Appendix F.
An increase in q¯ has a positive effect on lifetime consumer surplus. This result occurs be-
cause, although individual consumers are worse off, new consumers with higher q enter the
market and buy a product. Therefore, consumer density increases. As for q in the interior
case, even if the instantaneous consumer surplus rises, the advertising effects dominates
and the lifetime consumer surplus therefore declines. In the corner case, instantaneous
consumer surplus declines, while the advertising effect dominates, when the preference
20
dispersion is relatively large. Therefore, lifetime consumer surplus is improved. If the di-
version is relatively small, however, the change of lifetime consumer surplus is determined
by the technological gap. When sH increases, the advertising effect is very large, and life-
time consumer surplus increases in both the interior and corner cases. In the case of sL, the
signs are ambiguous in both cases. If the diversity of preference and technological gap are
relatively small, the advertising effect is so large that lifetime consumer surplus decreases.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described a differential duopoly game in which each firm voluntarily
advertises to persuade consumers to buy its products over that of the other firm. We have
assumed that the technology levels of firms are exogenously given. Under this situation,
we have analyzed both interior and corner cases and investigated how the diversity of
preference and technological gap affect advertising, profit, and economic welfare using the
vertical product differentiation model.
We have shown that effects of the minimum willingness to pay and the technology of
firm L on firm L’s lifetime profit may differ in both cases. In the corner case, firm L has the
opportunity to increase its profits. This result was similar to that previously obtained for
an uncovered market (Tenryu and Kamei (2014)). We have also shown that changes in pref-
erence dispersion and technological gap differently affect individual utility and consumer
surplus.
The model described here represents only a beginning to the investigation of consumer
behavior using the utility-based approach. This investigation could be extended in several
directions. One avenue of future research is to consider a nonlinear state game and the
resulting interaction between prices and advertising investments. The advertising invest-
ment strategies in this case would be represented by Cobb-Douglas or quadratic function
instead of a linear function. Another direction for research is to introduce another adver-
tising model into the present model. For example, we could use the Lanchester model to
extend the present model to two industries model.
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Appendix A. Proof of proposition 1
In the interior case, as seen from (13), we may easily confirm that firm H’s advertising
investment is always larger than firm L’s.
AIH   AIL =
a(q¯   q)(q¯ + q   2)(sH   sL)
6m(l+ r)
> 0.
Similarly, in the corner case from (20), we obtain the following equation:
ACH   ACL =
a[(q¯   1)2(sH   sL)2 + (q   1)2(4sH   sL)sL]
8m(l+ r)(sH   sL) > 0.
According to (23), we may compare the firms’ profits.
V IH  V IL = m(AIH   AIL)
"
2N(0)
a
+
AIH + A
I
L
r
#
> 0.
Similarly, we can confirm that VCH > V
C
L .
Appendix B. The remaining derivatives of ACH and A
C
L
Note that the following relations hold.
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sLθ¯ − θ
θ¯ − 4θ + 3
θ¯ + θ − 2
θ¯ − 2θ + 1
1
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θ¯ − θ
θ¯ − 1
θ¯ + θ − 2
θ¯ − 1
θ¯ − θ
θ¯ − 2θ − 1
2θ¯ − 3θ + 1
2(θ¯ − 2θ − 1)
Figure 5: The Relationships among Parameters (1)
Because the interior case is clear, we need prove only the corner case. Differentiating
(20) with respect to the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL yields the following equations:
¶ACH
¶q¯
=
a[(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sL]
4m(l+ r)
> 0,
¶ACH
¶q
=
a[(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sL]sL
4m(l+ r)(sH   sL) > 0,
¶ACH
¶sH
=
a[(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sL][(q¯   1)sH   (q¯ + q   2)sL]
8m(l+ r)(sH   sL)2 > 0,
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¶ACH
¶sL
=  a[(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sL][(q¯   2q + 1)sH   (q¯   q)sL]
8m(l+ r)(sH   sL)2 < 0,
¶ACL
¶q¯
=
a(q   1)sL
4m(l+ r)
> 0,
¶ACL
¶sH
=
a(q   1)2s2L
4m(l+ r)(sH   sL)2 > 0.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 2
First, we differentiate (20) with respect to q.
¶ACL
¶q
=
a[(q¯   4q + 3)sH   (q¯   2q + 1)sL]sL
4m(l+ r)(sH   sL)
The sign is determined by the relationship between sHsL and
q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3 . To confirm this, we
compare the upper and lower bounds in the corner case with q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3 as follows.
q¯   2q + 1
q¯   4q + 3  
q¯   q
q¯   4q + 3 =  
q   1
q¯   4q + 3 < 0
q¯   2q + 1
q¯   4q + 3  
q¯ + q   2
q¯   2q + 1 =  
(q¯   8q + 7)(q   1)
(q¯   2q + 1)(q¯   4q + 3)
These calculations imply that, if q¯ > 8q   7, the lower bound is larger than q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3 and
that, if 4q   3 < q¯  8q   7, 4q   3 < q¯  8q   7 is between the upper and lower bounds.
Therefore, we can summarize the result as presented above.
Similarly, we differentiate (20) with respect to sL.
¶ACL
¶sL
=
a(q   1)[(q¯   2q + 1)s2H   2(q¯   q)sHsL + (q¯   q)s2L]
4m(l+ r)(sH   sL)2 . (30)
The sign is determined by the equation (q¯   2q + 1)s2H   2(q¯   q)sHsL + (q¯   q)s2L. Let us
check the value of this equation at the lower bound. We substitute sH =
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1sL into the
equation as follows:
s2L

(q¯ + q   2)2
q¯   2q + 1  
2(q¯   q)(q¯ + q   2)
q¯   2q + 1 + (q¯   q)

=   (q¯   5q + 4)(q   1)
q¯   2q + 1 s
2
L.
This calculation implies that, at the lower bound, the equation is nonpositive if q¯  5q   4
and positive if 4q   3 < q¯ < 5q   4. The abscissa of the vertex is smaller than the lower
bound value17 such that, in the region where 4q   3 < q¯ < 5q   4, the equation and (30)
17See Appendix B.
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are positive. Similarly, let us check the equation value at the upper bound by substituting
sH =
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3sL into the equation as follows:
s2L

(q¯   2q + 1)(q¯   q)
(q¯   4q + 3)2  
2(q¯   q)
q¯   4q + 3 + (q¯   q)

=   (q¯   q)(q¯   10q + 9)(q   1)
(q¯   4q + 3)2 . (31)
This calculation implies that, at the upper bound, the equation is negative if q¯ > 10q  9 and
nonnegative if 4q   3 < q¯  10q   9. Thus, in the region where q¯ > 10q   9, the equation
and (30) are negative.
Within 5q   4  q¯  10q   9, the sign of the equation changes from negative to positive
at the solution, sH =
(q¯ q)+
p
(q¯ q)(q 1)
q¯ 2q+1 . Therefore we can summarize these results as the
table given in the proposition.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
We differentiate (23) with respect to the parameters as follows:
¶Vki
¶y
=
2m
r
"
(Aki + A
k
j )
¶Aki
¶y
+ Aki
¶Akj
¶y
#
, i, j( 6= i) 2 fH, Lg, k 2 fI,Cg, (32)
where y 2 fq¯, q, sH, sLg. In the interior case, the effects of the parameters q¯, q, sH, and sL
on both firms’ advertising behavior are the same. Thus, (32) has the same sign for each
parameter.
In the corner case, if y is q¯ or sH,
¶AIi
¶y is positive such that
¶V Ii
¶y is positive. In contrast, if y
is q or sL, the effects of these parameters on both firms’ advertising investment may differ
because of the indeterminacy of firm L’s advertising behavior. The change in consumer
density is represented by the sum of the marginal advertising effects as follows:
¶NC
¶y
=
a
l
 
¶ACH
¶y
+
¶ACL
¶y
!
.
According to Proposition 2, this result is uniquely determined: the effect of q is positive, and
that of sL is negative. Using this result, we can rearrange (32) and investigate the effects of
the parameters on firm H’s lifetime profit.
¶VCH
¶q
=
2m
r
"
ACH
 
¶ACH
¶q
+
¶ACL
¶q
!
| {z }
(+)
+ACH
¶ACH
¶q| {z }
(+)
#
> 0,
¶VCH
¶sL
=
2m
r
"
ACH
 
¶ACH
¶sL
+
¶ACL
¶sL
!
| {z }
( )
+ACH
¶ACH
¶sL| {z }
( )
#
< 0.
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Finally, we investigate the effects of q and sL on firm L’s lifetime profit. We only prove the
cases in which q and sL differently affect advertising and the consumer density. First, for a
change in q, we consider the case in which 4q   3  q < 8q   7 and q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1 <
sH
sL
< q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3 .
¶VCL
¶q
=
2m
r
"
ACL
 
¶ACH
¶q
+
¶ACL
¶q
!
| {z }
(+)
+ACH
¶ACL
¶q
#
=
a2sLSa(q¯, q, sH, sL)
32m2(l+ r)2(sH   sL) , (33)
where
Sa(q¯, q, sH, sL) = (q¯   1)2(q¯   4q + 3)s2H   2(q¯   2q + 1)3sHsL
+ (q¯   q)[(q¯   q)(q¯   4q + 3)  2(q¯   2q + 1)(q   1)]sL.
Because the sign of (33) depends on that of Sa, we focus on the sign of this value. We
check the function value at the upper bound of the technology gap between the firms. The
inflection point of Sa is sH =
(q¯ 2q+1)3
(q¯ 1)2(q¯ 4q+3) sL, which is smaller than sH =
q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3sL, and Sa
is positive at sH =
q¯ 2q+1
q¯ 4q+3sL. Next, we check the sign at the lower bound of the technology
gap, sH =
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1sL. After tedious calculations, we obtain the following equation:
Sa =

2(q   1)sL
q¯   2q + 1
2
[3q¯3   (22q   13)q¯2 + (31q2   18q   4)q¯   16q¯3 + 17q2   8q + 4]
The sign is determined by that of the cubic function in the square brackets. The cubic
function reaches a local minimum at q¯  4.0353q  3.0353 and becomes negative at q¯ = 4q 
3. This result means that, for q¯ = 4q   3, the function stays positive after it changes from
negative to positive. The function has a solution between (5q  4, 6q  5). We represent the
solution as q¯a.18 The function is positive at q¯ 2 (q¯a, 8q   7), and thus Sa is also positive.
Conversely, for q¯ 2 (4q   3, q¯a], we can confirm that
Sa(q¯, q, sH, sL)
8>><>>:
> 0 if sHsL 2

sa, q¯ 2q+1q¯ 4q+3

,
= 0 if sHsL = sa,
< 0 if sHsL 2

q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1 , sa

,
where sa is a solution of Sa.
sa =
sH
sL
=
(q¯   2q + 1)3 +pDa
(q¯   q)2(q   4q + 3) ,
where
Da = (q¯  2q+ 1)6  (q¯  q)2(q¯  q)(q  4q+ 3)[(q¯  q)(q¯  4q+ 3)  2(q¯  2q+ 1)(q  1)]
18When q = 2, q¯a is 6.67918.
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Next, let us consider the effect of sL on VCL . According to Lemma 2, if
¶ACL
¶sL
is nonpositive,
we can easily confirm that ¶V
C
L
¶sL
is negative. Thus, we need only consider the cases where (i)
4q   3 < q¯ < 5q   4 and (ii) 5q   4  q¯  10q   9 and (q¯ q)+
p
(q¯ q)(q 1)
q¯ 2q+1 <
sH
sL
< q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 .
¶VCL
¶sL
=
2m
r
"
ACL
 
¶ACH
¶sL
+
¶ACL
¶sL
!
| {z }
( )
+ACH
¶ACL
¶sL
#
=
a2(q   1)Sb(q¯, q, sH, sL)
32m2(l+ r)2(sH   sL)2 , (34)
where
Sb(q¯, q, sH, sL) = (q¯   1)2(q¯   2q + 1)s3H   4(q¯   q)[(q¯   q)2 + (q   1)2]s2HsL
+ (q¯   q)[(q¯   2q + 1)(q¯   3q + 2) + 4(q¯   q)2]sHs2L   2(q¯   q)2[(q   2q + 1)]s3L.
The function Sb is negative and decreasing at sH = sL, which means that it changes to
increasing at the local minimum for the region where sH > sL. In addition, for q¯ > 4q   3,
Sb is negative at both sH =
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1sL and sH =
(q¯ q)+
p
(q¯ q)(q 1)
q¯ 2q+1 sL. However, the value of
Sb at sH =
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3sL is ambiguous. Substituting sH =
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3sL into Sb yields the following
equation:
Sb =  
4(q¯   q)2(q   1)2s3L
(q¯   4q + 3)3 [3q¯
2   2(13q   10)q¯ + 32q2   38q + 9].
This equation is nonnegative for 4q < q¯  7.181q   6.181 and negative for the other region.
Therefore, for 4q < q¯  7.181q   6.181, there exists a q-intercept for Sb. This result means
that Sb is negative under the q-intercept but positive over it. For the region where q¯ >
7.181q   6.181, Sb is negative.
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 3
Note that the following relations hold:
sH
sLθ¯ + θ − 2
θ¯ − 2θ + 1
1
covered market
corner caseinterior case
11θ¯ − 7θ − 4
2θ¯ − 7θ + 5
7θ¯ − 2θ − 5
7θ¯ − 11θ + 4
θ¯ − θ
θ¯ − 2θ − 1
3(θ¯ − θ)
3θ¯ − 4θ + 1
Figure 6: The Relationships among Parameters (2)
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Let us consider the interior case. Using (24), (25), and (28), we may obtain the sum of
the instantaneous utility as follows:
WLL +W
I
H =
1
18
"
[3(2q¯   q   1)(q   1)  2(q¯   2q + 1)2]sH
+ [3(q¯   1)(q¯   2q + 1) + 2(2q¯   q   1)2]sL
#
.
We differentiate this equation with respect to the parameters.
¶(W IL +W
I
H)
¶q¯
=
( 2q¯ + 7q   5)sH + (11q¯   7q   4)sL
9
> 0
¶(W IL +W
I
H)
¶q
=
(7q¯   11q + 4)sH   (7q¯   2q   5)sL
9
(35)
¶(W IL +W
I
H)
¶sH
=
3(2q¯   q   1)(q   1)  2(q¯   2q + 1)2
18
(36)
¶(W IL +W
I
H)
¶sL
=
3(q¯   1)(q¯   2q + 1) + 2(2q¯   q   1)2]sL
18
> 0.
As for (35), we obtain the following equation:
¶(W IL +W
I
L)
¶q
8>><>>:
> 0 if 7q¯ 2q 57q¯ 11q+4 <
sH
sL
< q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1
= 0 if sHsL =
7q¯ 2q 5
7q¯ 11q+4
< 0 if 1 < sHsL <
7q¯ 2q 5
7q¯ 11q+4 .
To determine the sign of (36), we arrange the numerator as  2q¯2 + 2(7q   5)q¯   11q2 +
8q + 1. For the region where q¯ > 4q   3, the equation is decreasing and has one solution,
q¯  6.098q   5.098. Therefore, we obtain the following equation:
¶(W IL +W
I
H)
¶sH
8><>:
> 0 if 4q   3 < q¯ < 6.098q   5.098
= 0 if q¯ = 6.098q   5.098
< 0 if 6.098q   5.098 < q¯.
Similarly, let us consider the corner case. Using (26), (27), and (28), we may obtain the
sum of the instantaneous utility as follows:
WCL +W
C
H =
1
18(sH   sL)2
"
(q¯   1)2s3H + f(q¯   2q + 1)2   2(q¯   1)(q   1)gs2HsL
  (q¯   q)(5q¯   7q + 2)sHs2L + 3(q¯   q)2s3L
#
.
Using the relations in Figures 1 and 2 and differentiating this equation with respect to the
parameters yields the following equations:
¶(WCL +W
C
H)
¶q¯
=
(q¯   1)sH + 3(q¯   q)sL
4
> 0,
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¶(WCL +W
C
H)
¶q
=   [(3q¯   4q + 1)sH   3(q¯   q)sL]sL
4(sH   sL) < 0,
¶(WCL +W
C
H)
¶sH
=
f(q¯   1)sH   (q¯ + q   2)sLgf(q¯   1)sH   (q¯   q)sLg
8(sH   sL)2 > 0,
¶(WCL +W
C
H)
¶sL
=
3(q¯   q)2(sH   sL)2 + (q   1)2s2H
8(sH   sL)2 > 0.
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 6
We differentiate (29) with respect to y 2 fq¯, q, sH, sLg and obtain the following equation:
¶Wk
¶y
=
l
r(l+ r)
"
Nk
¶(WkL +W
k
H)
¶y| {z }
the utility effect
+ (WkL +W
k
H)
¶Nk
¶y| {z }
the advertising effect
#
.
Because the effect of the parameters is divided into the utility and advertising effects, we
only prove the case where these effects differently impact the lifetime consumer surplus,
Wk. First, we consider the interior case. For q, we obtain
¶W I
¶q
=
a2l(sH   sL)
162mlr(l+ r)2

266664
(q¯   2q + 1)f(2q¯   q   1)(14q¯   13q   1)
+ (q¯   2q + 1)(15q¯   21q + 6)gsH
  f[(2q¯   q   1)2 + (q¯   2q + 1)2](7q¯   2q   5)
+ [3(q¯   1)(q¯   2q + 1) + 2(2q¯   q   1)2](4q¯   5q + 1)gsL
377775 .
This equation is negative because the following relation is always satisfied.
sH
sL
<
q¯ + q   2
q¯   2q + 1 <
[(2q¯   q   1)2 + (q¯   2q + 1)2](7q¯   2q   5)
+ [3(q¯   1)(q¯   2q + 1) + 2(2q¯   q   1)2](4q¯   5q + 1)
(q¯   2q + 1)f(2q¯   q   1)(14q¯   13q   1)
+ (q¯   2q + 1)(15q¯   21q + 6)g
.
Therefore, ¶W
I
¶q is always negative. Similarly, for sH, we obtain
¶W I
¶sH
=
a2lf(2q¯   q   1)2 + (q¯   2q + 1)2g
324mlr(l+ r)2

264 3(2q¯   q   1)(q   1)(sH   sL)+ (2q¯   q   1)f3(q   1)sH + 2(q¯ + q   2)sLg
+ (q¯   2q + 1)f 4(q¯   2q + 1)sH + (9q¯   6q   3)sLg
375 .
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We can easily confirm that, for the third term in the square brackets,
sH
sL
<
q¯ + q   2
q¯   2q + 1 <
9q¯   6q   3
4(q¯   2q + 1) .
Therefore, ¶W
I
¶sH
is always positive. Finally, for sL, we obtain
¶W I
¶sL
=
a2lf(2q¯   q   1)2 + (q¯   2q + 1)2g
324mlr(l+ r)2

" f(2q¯   q   1)(4q¯   5q + 1) + (q¯   2q + 1)(5q¯   4q   1)gsH
  2f2(2q¯   q   1)2 + 3(q¯   1)(q¯   2q + 1)gsL
#
.
The sign of this equation depends on the sign in the square brackets; that is,
¶W I
¶sL
R 0 () sH
sL
R 4(2q¯   q   1)
2 + 6(q¯   1)(q¯   2q + 1)
(2q¯   q   1)(4q¯   q + 1) + (q¯   2q + 1)(5q¯   4q   1)  Q.
We can easily confirm that the value of the right-hand side is greater than 1. We compare
this equation with the upper bound value of the interior case, sHsL =
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1 .
Q  q¯ + q   2
q¯   2q + 1 =
3f3q¯3   (19q   10)q¯2 + (25q2   12q   4)q¯   7q3   4q2 + 10q   2g
(q¯   2q + 1)f(2q¯   q   1)(4q¯   q + 1) + (q¯   2q + 1)(5q¯   4q   1)g .
The sign is determined by the cubic function in the numerator. The cubic function reaches
a local minimum at q¯  3.407q  2.407 and is negative at q¯ = 4q  3. This result means that,
for q¯ > 4q  3, the cubic function is increasing and positive after the largest q¯-intercept. The
cubic function, therefore, has one solution between 4q   3 and 5q   4, which is represented
as q¯b.19 For the region where q¯ > q¯b, the sign is positive, and thus ¶W
I
¶sL
is always negative.
Otherwise, we obtain
¶W I
¶sL
8>><>>:
> 0 if Q < sHsL <
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1
= 0 if sHsL = Q
< 0 if 1 < sHsL < Q.
Next, we consider the corner case. As for q, we obtain
¶WC
¶q
=
a2lsLSc(q¯, q, sH, sL)
32mlr(l+ r)2(sH   sL)2 ,
where
Sc(q¯, q, sH, sL) =  3(q¯   1)3s3H
+ 2f(q¯   1)3 + 2(q¯   q)2(5q¯   8q + 3) + 2(3q¯   4q + 1)(q   1)2gs2HsL
19If q = 2, q¯b is 5.649.
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  (q¯   q)f12(q¯   2q + 1)2 + (q¯   1)(7q¯   9q + 2)gsHs2L
+ 9(q¯   q)2(q¯   2q + 1)s3L.
This function, Sc, is positive and increasing at sH = sL. This result means that, for sH > sL,
the function changes from increasing to decreasing at the local maximum. In addition, the
function is positive at sH =
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1sL and, at sH =
q¯ q
q¯ 2q+1sL,
Sc =
4(q¯   q)2(q   1)s3L
(q¯   4q + 3)3
 [q¯3 + (8q   11)q¯2   (90q2   164q + 71)q¯ + 120q3   270q2 + 188q   39].
The cubic function in the square brackets reaches a local minimum at q¯  3.425q   2.425
and is thus increasing for the region where q¯ > 4q   3. Furthermore, there exists a solution
of the cubic function between 5q  4 and 6q  5, which is represented as q¯c.20 Therefore, for
4q   3 < q¯  q¯c, Sc is positive at sH = q¯+q 2q¯ 2q+1sL and negative at sH = q¯ qq¯ 2q+1sL. This result
means that there exists a solution of Sc between these boundaries, which is represented as
sH = sbsL. We summarize the result as follows:
¶WC
¶q
=
a2lsLSc(q¯, q, sH, sL)
32mlr(l+ r)2(sH   sL)2
8>><>>:
> 0 if q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1  sHsL < sb
= 0 if sHsL = sb
< 0 if sb <
sH
sL
< q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 .
For q¯ > q¯c, Scis positive such that ¶W
C
¶q is positive.
As for sL, we obtain
¶WC
¶sL
=
a2lsHSd(q¯, q, sH, sL)
32mlr(l+ r)2(sH   sL) ,
where
Sd(q¯, q, sH, sL) = (q¯   1)3(q¯   q)s3H   f2(q¯   1)(q¯   q)2 + (q¯   2q + 1)3(2q¯   3q + 1)
+ 2(q¯   q)(q¯   2q + 1)2(q   1)gs2HsL + (q¯   q)f15(q¯   q)2(q   1)
+ 3(q¯   q)(q¯   2q + 1)(3q¯   4q + 1) + (q¯   3q + 2)(q   1)2gsHs2L
  (q¯   q)2f(q¯   2q + 1)(2q¯   3q + 1) + 6(q¯   q)(q   1)gs3L.
The function, Sd, is negative and decreasing at sH = sL. This result implies that, for the
region where sH > sL, the function changes from decreasing to increasing at the local mini-
mum. In addition, the function is negative at sH =
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1sL and, at sH =
q¯ q
q¯ 2q+1sL,
Sd =
(q¯   q)2(q   1)s3L
(q¯   4q + 3)3
20If q = 2, q¯c is 6.075.
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
"
  5q¯4 + (37q   17)q¯3   (70q2   29q   11)q¯2
+ (92q3   136q2 + 107q   43)q¯   48q4 + 100q3   82q2 + 19q + 6
#
Because the inflection point of the quartic function at the larger q¯ is q¯  2.893q   1.893, the
function is concave for q¯ > 4q   3. The function is positive at q¯ = 4q   3 and thus changes
to negative at q¯d, which exists for q¯ 2 (5q   4, 6q   5). 21 Therefore, for 4q   3 < q¯  q¯d,
Sd is negative at sH =
q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1sL and non-negative at sH =
q¯ q
q¯ 2q+1sL. This result means that
there exists a solution of Sd between these boundaries, which is represented as sH = scsL.
We summarize the result as follows:
¶WC
¶sL
=
a2lsHSd(q¯, q, sH, sL)
32mlr(l+ r)2(sH   sL)
8>><>>:
< 0 if q¯+q 2
q¯ 2q+1  sHsL < sc
= 0 if sHsL = sc
> 0 if sc < sHsL <
q¯ q
q¯ 4q+3 .
For q¯ > q¯d, Sd is negative such that ¶W
C
¶sL
is also negative.
21If q = 2, qd is 6.369.
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